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What happens after a successful crowdfunding campaign? 
 
ABSTRACT 
While a successful crowdfunding campaign represents a key milestone, it only represents the 
beginning for entrepreneurs to (hopefully) realize their ambitions with the fresh money raised. In 
this chapter, we provide an overview of the relatively scant literature that examines what happens 
after a successful crowdfunding campaign, differentiating between reward-based, lending-based, 
and equity-based crowdfunding. Specifically, we focus on the failure rate of crowdfunded 
ventures, the ability of crowdfunded ventures to secure follow-on funding, the performance of 
crowdfunded ventures, whether crowdfunded ventures deliver rewards (on time), and returns for 




The promise of crowdfunding, defined as “the efforts by entrepreneurial individuals and 
groups—cultural, social, and for-profit—to fund their ventures by drawing on relatively small 
contributions from a relatively large number of individuals using the Internet, without standard 
financial intermediaries” (Mollick, 2014: 2) is significant. Scholars have highlighted that 
crowdfunding represents “a valuable alternative source of funding for entrepreneurs seeking 
external financing” (Belleflamme et al., 2014: 585), “a democratic funding context” (Allison et 
al., 2017: 707) that exploits the “wisdom of crowds” (Mollick and Nanda, 2016: 1551), and “has 
been greeted with enthusiasm by entrepreneurs, policymakers, and the general public alike” 
(Fleming and Sorenson, 2016: 6).  
Following the stunning growth of crowdfunding markets across the globe (see KPMG, 
2016; Massolution, 2015), scholars have increasingly examined the crowdfunding phenomenon 
and—as highlighted in the previous chapter—have primarily focused on the factors that facilitate 
funding success on crowdfunding platforms (e.g., Ahlers et al., 2015; Allison et al., 2015, 2017; 
Block et al., 2017; Butticè et al., 2017; Chan and Parhankangas, 2017; Colombo et al., 2015; 
Courtney et al., 2017; Davis et al., 2017; Giudici et al., 2017; Josefy et al., 2017; Mollick, 2014; 
Parhankangas and Renko, 2017; Skirnevskiy et al., 2017; Vismara, 2016, 2017; Vulkan et al., 
2016). Scholars have also suggested that it is important to differentiate between different 
crowdfunding types, including reward-based crowdfunding, lending-based crowdfunding and 
equity-based crowdfunding (Fleming and Sorenson, 2016; Mollick, 2014; Vismara, 2017). 
 It is interesting to note that “success” in current crowdfunding research is frequently 
defined as raising funds on crowdfunding platforms. Raising funds definitely represents an 
important milestone for entrepreneurs, who often require external financing to form and scale 
their ventures (Cassar, 2004; Cosh et al., 2009). Still, it typically only represents the very 
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beginning because after entrepreneurs have raised funds from the crowd, the real challenges are 
to build viable businesses, that create innovative products or services, generate employment, and 
provide the promised rewards or financial returns (Signori and Vismara, 2017). While the 
promise of crowdfunding might be significant, several scholars have also raised caution in that 
many firms or projects might get funded that should not get funded, that the crowdfunding 
market might be vulnerable to fraud, and that particular types of crowdfunding, such as equity-
based crowdfunding may not provide sufficient returns to be attractive in the future (Blanding, 
2013; Isenberg, 2012). 
 In this chapter, we review the literature that investigates firms or projects after they have 
successfully raised funds on crowdfunding platforms. For this purpose, we first focus on firm 
outcomes, including firm failure, follow-on fundraising, and firm performance. When 
governments embrace crowdfunding this is primarily because policymakers expect that 
crowdfunding will allow firms with innovative ideas to form, grow, and flourish. Second, we take 
the perspective of entrepreneurs and focus on the promises they made to the crowd, such as the 
delivery of rewards or the provision of returns. Last, we switch to the supply of capital and 
examine the returns granted by crowdfunding to backers. When the general public and investors 
embrace crowdfunding this is primarily because they expect that crowdfunding will provide them 
with non-financial and financial benefits. Finally, we provide a roadmap for scholars by 
providing an overview of important topics that warrant more attention in future research. 
 
8.2. What happens after the campaign? 
In this section, we first focus on firm outcomes after a successful crowdfunding campaign, 
including firm failure, follow-on fundraising, and firm performance. Second, we focus on the 
promises made by entrepreneurs to the crowd, including the delivery of rewards or the provision 
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of returns. Differentiating between these two types of outcomes is important for at least two 
reasons. First, by definition, firm outcomes only relate to firms but not all proponents of 
crowdfunding platforms are firms. For instance, contrary to equity-based crowdfunding where 
proponents are by definition firms, projects on reward-based crowdfunding platforms do not 
necessarily relate to firms and are actually often launched by individuals (Colombo et al., 2015; 
Vismara, 2017). Second, outcomes that are “good” for the crowd might not necessarily be “good” 
for firms and vice versa. For example, while firms might provide rewards to the crowd, the firms 
themselves may remain simple “mom and pop” businesses that do not innovate, grow, generate 
employment or create significant value added or may eventually go bankrupt.   
 
8.2.1. Firm outcomes 
One of the firms in the crowdfunding “hall of fame” is Pebble Technology Corporation, which 
developed and sold smartwatches including the Pebble Smart Watch (e.g., Mollick and Robb, 
2016; Thürridl and Kamleitner, 2016). In line with insights from the literature on financial 
bootstrapping (Winborg and Landström, 2001), Canadian engineer Eric Migicovsky and several 
friends developed an early version of the smartwatch in their garage. In 2011, the project was 
accepted into Y Combinator—an American seed accelerator—that provided seed funding. After 
experiencing difficulties in raising additional “traditional” funding (e.g., venture capital [VC]), 
Eric Migicovsky turned to reward-based crowdfunding. On Kickstarter, with a campaign running 
from April 11, 2012, through May 18, 2012, Pebble Technology raised over 10 million USD 
from more than 68,900 backers, thereby breaking the Kickstarter record for raising the most 
money at that time. In 2013, the firm was able to raise a Series A round of 15 million USD from 
Charles River Ventures—a VC firm focused on early-stage investments in technology and new 
media companies. By the end of 2014, Pebble sold its one-millionth smartwatch. In 2015, Pebble 
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launched the Pebble Time, again with Kickstarter, now raising over 20 million USD. In 
December 2016, however, Pebble filed for insolvency. Fitbit acquired most of Pebble’s assets 
and employees and paid some 23 million USD for Pebble’s intellectual property. This anecdotal 
case evidence shows that successfully raising initial crowdfunding indeed only represents a first 
milestone.  
 Below, we provide more systematic evidence from academic research on the failure, 
follow-on fundraising, and performance of crowdfunded firms. This evidence is summarized in 
Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Firm failure 
For reward-based crowdfunding, Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) use survey evidence from 
project creators of design, technology, and video games projects who attempted to raise money 
on Kickstarter between 2009 and mid-2012. They investigate these three specific categories of 
projects to obtain projects that resemble conventional start-ups. Responses are obtained from 230 
(39% response rate) projects that raised funding on Kickstarter and 128 (23.3% response rate) 
projects that failed to raise funding. In December 2013, 90% of projects that raised funding 
remained ongoing ventures (thus, for 1 to 4 years after funding). Moreover, 60% of projects that 
failed to raise funding remained ongoing ventures. Obviously, these percentages need to be 
interpreted with care as ventures that failed before the survey are less likely (unlikely) to 
participate in the survey. Few factors are statistically related to the probability that projects 
remain active. Among them, the most significant is the project creators’ self-assessment of the 
completeness of their pre-campaign financial plan detailing how funds would be spent. 
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Signori and Vismara (2017) provide fine-grained insights on failures of equity 
crowdfunded firms. For this purpose, they use the population of 212 firms that successfully raised 
initial equity crowdfunding on the UK’s largest equity crowdfunding platform Crowdcube from 
inception (2011) to 2015. In terms of the drivers of failure, they show that those equity 
crowdfunded firms that eventually fail are the ones that are less likely to have positive sales at the 
time of the crowdfunding campaign and provide voting shares. Equity crowdfunded firms that 
raised their target capital quickly and those that are funded by professional investors are less 
likely to subsequently fail. Indeed, interestingly, none of the equity crowdfunded firms that 
professional investors backed eventually failed. With respect to the prevalence of firm failure, 
Signori and Vismara (2017) find that 18% of the firms failed by the end of April 2017, with 
80.7% of firms that did not realize an exit yet. For firms that raised financing between 2011 and 
2013 the failure rate is 32.1% (with 64.3% of firms that did not realize an exit yet), while for the 
more recently funded firms that raised financing between 2014 and 2015 the failure rate is 12.8% 
(with 86.5% of firms that did not realize an exit yet). 
We can benchmark these numbers against evidence from VC, for instance. Puri and 
Zarutskie (2012) illustrate that after the length of a typical VC investment, 39.7% of US VC-
financed firms fail and 78.9% of non-VC-financed firms fail. After the length of a typical VC 
investment, most firms have realized an exit with only 10.7% of VC-financed firms that are active 
without an exit event and 20.04% of non-VC-financed firms without an exit event. Cumulative 
failure rates of VC-financed firms equal 4.9% and 12.8% for 1 and 2 years after the VC 
investment, respectively. These statistics suggest that failure rates will likely be higher for equity 
crowdfunded firms relative to VC-financed firms. Walthoff-Borm et al. (2017a) examine the 
failure of equity crowdfunded firms using a sample of UK firms that raised financing through 
Crowdcube and Seedrs and a matched sample of UK non-equity crowdfunded firms. They show 
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that the failure rate of equity crowdfunded firms is significantly higher than the failure rate of 
similar UK non-equity crowdfunded firms matched on firm age, size and industry. 
 
Follow-on fundraising 
Relative to other firm outcomes, there is a somewhat richer literature on the consequences of 
crowdfunding for follow-on fundraising both from studies using real-life data as well as studies 
using an experimental design.  
 Several studies have focused on the occurrence of and the factors related to follow-on 
fundraising in crowdfunded firms. Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) highlight that in their 
sample of projects that raised reward-based crowdfunding on Kickstarter, some projects raised 
additional funds. Specifically, over 20% used self-funding, over 15% used funding from family 
and friends, and some 15% raised angel finance. Over 5% used follow-up crowdfunding. VC was 
raised by less than 5% of projects. Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) further show that projects 
with larger goals that were funded, and projects that were overfunded the most, were more likely 
to attract additional external funding (i.e., VC, angels, banks, companies). Project creators’ self-
assessment of the completeness of their pre-campaign financial plan was also correlated with 
raising external funding. Finally, projects where the creators had specific industry experience 
were three times as likely to get external funding compared to those that did not have such 
backgrounds. 
Signori and Vismara (2017) show that in their sample of firms that raised equity 
crowdfunding through Crowdcube, some 35% raised follow-on funding in the form of either 
private equity injections (9%) or follow-on crowdfunding offerings (25%). They further show 
that firms with more dispersed ownership are less likely to issue further equity, while those that 
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reach the target capital more quickly in their initial crowdfunding campaign are more likely to 
launch a follow-on offering. 
 The evidence of the above studies shows that many crowdfunded ventures do raise 
additional funding but also that many do not raise additional funding. However, these studies do 
not address whether crowdfunding facilitates or hampers the attraction of VC relative to firms 
that did not raise crowdfunding. Using experimental designs, Drover et al. (2017) show that the 
volume of crowdfunders has no significant influence on the willingness of VCs to conduct a due 
diligence—a necessary step before firms can obtain funding—in the lending and equity models. 
However, there is an overall higher willingness of VCs to conduct a due diligence on a reward-
crowdfunded firm with a high volume of crowdfunders. VCs also favor conducting a due 
diligence on investment opportunities funded through platforms that have an established record 
of investment success. These findings suggest that ventures can “borrow” the reputations of more 
established crowdfunding platforms. Also using an experimental design, Mödl (2017) highlights 
that crowdfunding is generally is a negative signal for professional VCs. However, high sums of 
reward-based crowdfunding, collected fast by startups with a Business-to-Consumer (B2C) 
business model, can have a positive effect on VC managers’ investment decisions. 
Consistent with the evidence from experimental studies, Sorenson et al. (2016) shows that 
a 1% increase in the annual number of Kickstarter campaigns in 1 year predicted a 0.097% 
increase in the annual number of VC campaigns in the following year, a 0.092% increase in the 
subsequent year, and about a 0.067% increase in the third year. Overall, there seems to be 
relatively consistent evidence that successful reward-based crowdfunding facilitates the 
subsequent receipt of VC, particularly from established platforms and in a B2C context. 
However, for other forms of crowdfunding such as lending-based or equity-based crowdfunding 





The impact of crowdfunding on more continuous, dynamic firm outcomes, such as firm financial 
performance, firm innovative performance or firm growth, is probably the least explored of the 
long-term outcomes of crowdfunding. 
 For reward-based crowdfunding, Mollick and Kuppuswamy’s (2014) survey data 
illustrates that projects funded through Kickstarter added, on average, 2.2 employees—with a 
particularly high standard deviation of 9.6—since their campaign ended. Moreover, 32% of 
ongoing firms that successfully raised funding reported yearly revenues of over $100,000 a year 
after their campaign, where 10% of these were firms that had already been making that level of 
revenues before the campaign.  
For equity-based crowdfunding, Walthoff-Borm et al. (2017a) find that UK equity 
crowdfunded firms exhibit lower financial performance (i.e., return on assets) but higher 
innovative performance (i.e., higher intangible assets ratios, patent applications and patents 
granted) relative to matched UK non-crowdfunded firms. They further examine differences 
between firms funded through Crowdcube and Seedrs. This distinction is interesting because 
Crowdcube uses a direct shareholder model (e.g., crowdinvestors become legal shareholders of 
the business they support), while Seedrs uses a nominee structure (e.g., the equity crowdfunding 
platform holds and manages the shares of the supported firms on behalf of the crowdinvestors). 
Equity crowdfunded firms financed through a nominee structure make smaller losses and the 
worst performing firms seem to be pushed towards failure more quickly relative to equity 
crowdfunded firms financed through a direct shareholder structure. Equity crowdfunded firms 
financed through a nominee structure also invest significantly more in intangible assets after the 
campaign, but those financed through a direct shareholder structure have more patent 
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applications, including foreign patent applications. Thus, it does not seem that one specific 
platform structure is universally better for firm performance relative to another platform 
structure. 
 
8.2.2. The promises made by entrepreneurs 
In reward-based crowdfunding, entrepreneurs promise to deliver a specific reward to their 
backers. In lending-based and equity-based crowdfunding, entrepreneurs promise their backers 
financial gains. Below, we provide systematic evidence on the delivery of rewards and the 
realization of financial returns in crowdfunding. We summarize this evidence in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Mollick (2014) reports that fraud—a first concern related to delivery—is very rare in reward-
based crowdfunding. A finding that is corroborated by more recent research by Cumming and 
colleagues (2017). Mollick (2014) shows that in only 3.6% of the campaigns there are direct 
signs of fraud. He further shows that the vast majority of founders seem to fulfill their 
obligations, but that many deliver later than expected. In the Design and Technology categories 
on Kickstarter, for projects that delivered goods, the mean delay was 1.28 months. Of the projects 
that were delayed, the mean delay to date was 2.4 months. Only 24.9% of projects delivered on 
time and 33% had yet to deliver. In the Film, Food, and Theater categories in Kickstarter similar 
statistics are observed: only 23.4% of projects delivered on time and for the projects that were 
delayed, the mean delay was 2.7 months. Overall, the reward-based crowdfunding market seems 
very fraud resistant and entrepreneurs often do provide rewards but generally with delays. 
Mollick (2014) and Mollick and Kuppuswamy (2014) show that these delays are correlated with 
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project size (goal) and the degree to which it was overfunded. In addition, the project creator’s 
assessment of having a complete project schedule before the launch of the campaign is correlated 
with reduced delays. 
 
8.2.3. Returns for investors 
For lending-based crowdfunding, returns can be generated when firms repay the interests and 
principal amount to their backers. Evidence from the Netherlands (Crowdfundmarkt, 2015) 
shows that in 2015 the average interest rate on lending-based crowdfunding projects equaled 
7.15% and the average duration of a loan equaled 52.7 months. Obviously, the average 7.15% 
interest rate is not equal to the realized return of crowdinvestors, which can be substantially lower 
due to defaults (e.g., firm failures) and costs that lending-based crowdfunding platforms transfer 
to their investors. Iyer et al. (2015) focus on peer-to-peer lending and use a large-scale sample of 
over 194,000 listings on Prosper. The average annual lender interest rate equals 16.6%. But as 
indicated before defaults are not uncommon. Indeed, over 30% of the funded listings default in 
the three-year duration of the loan. As one can expect, the default rate varies significantly with 
the credit category, where the default rate is 14.7% for the most creditworthy borrowers and 
51.6% for the least creditworthy borrowers. It is noteworthy that the delinquency rate on 
consumer loans for all commercial banks has been substantially lower in the last decade in the 
US (with a peak of 4.85% in the second quarter of 2009) (Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, 2017). The fraction of the principal repaid at the end of the loan term is on 
average 79.7% and ranges from 91.0% for the most creditworthy borrowers to 62.5% for the least 
creditworthy borrowers.  
 For equity-based crowdfunding, returns can only be realized when crowdinvestors exit 
firms (or receive dividends). Ahlers et al. (2015) demonstrate that at the time of the campaign 
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48% of the entrepreneurs in their sample listed on the Australian ASSOB platform envisaged an 
IPO as the most likely exit and 48% envisaged a trade sale as the most likely exit. Signori and 
Vismara (2017) show that of the 212 firms that raised initial equity-crowdfunding on Crowdcube 
between the inception of the platform in 2011 and 2015, only 3 exits were realized by the end of 
April 2017. All these exits were merger and acquisition (M&A) exits, which provided an average 
return of 48.8%. One example of an M&A exit is Camden Town Brewery that got acquired by 
Anheuser Busch InBev. The acquisition at the end of 2015—some 8 months after the closing of 
Camden’s crowdfunding equity campaign—delivered an annualized internal rate of return of 
111.9% to crowdinvestors.  
 
8.3. Integration of Research Findings, Avenues for Future Research and Overall 
Conclusion 
8.3.1. Integration of research findings 
In this chapter, we have synthesized the literature on firm outcomes, the delivery of rewards, and 
the provision of returns after crowdfunding campaigns. Current research has extensively focused 
on the factors that determine funding success on crowdfunding platforms, but research on the 
question of what happens after a successful crowdfunding campaign is relatively scarce. 
 In terms of firm outcomes, there is some evidence related to firm failure, suggesting that 
failures are neither non-trivial nor excessive amongst crowdfunded ventures (Mollick and 
Kuppuswamy, 2014; Signori and Vismara, 2017). There is also evidence that successful reward-
based crowdfunding—particularly from established platforms and in a B2C context—may 
facilitate the subsequent receipt of VC funds (Drover et al., 2017; Mödl, 2017; Sorenson et al., 
2016). Although angel-backed firms have a greater probability of attracting subsequent VC 
relative to crowdfunded firms (Ryu and Kim, 2017). For other forms of crowdfunding, namely 
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lending-based or equity-based crowdfunding, studies fail to find an effect or point towards a 
negative effect of crowdfunding on the subsequent ability of crowdfunded firms to attract VC 
funds (Drover et al., 2017; Mödl, 2017). In terms of firm financial and innovative performance, 
there is some anecdotal evidence that specific crowdfunded firms have performed well (and 
others not so well on specific outcomes). Unfortunately, more general, comprehensive evidence 
using a matched sample approach (e.g., Puri and Zarutskie, 2012, for VC funded firms relative to 
non-VC funded firms) is limited. An exception is a study by Walthoff-Borm et al. (2017a) that 
illustrates that crowdfunded firms have lower financial performance but greater innovative 
performance relative to matched non-crowdfunded firms. 
 In terms of entrepreneurs’ obligation to provide rewards, the literature is clear-cut. 
Specifically, crowdfunding platforms seem to be relatively fraud resistant (Cumming et al., 2017; 
Mollick, 2014). Rewards are generally provided to backers but this frequently occurs with a delay 
(Mollick, 2014; Mollick and Kuppuswamy, 2014). There is also anecdotal evidence on the 
returns promised to crowdinvestors, but the academic literature has not provided a clear-cut 
answer to the challenging question of how much net returns lending and equity crowdinvestors 
obtain and whether risk-adjusted returns are attractive. This lack of literature, particularly in the 
equity-based crowdfunding literature, is primarily driven by the limited exits realized on the 
platforms, the lack of (liquid) secondary markets, and the newness of the equity crowdfunding 
market.  
 From our literature review it becomes clear that we have only skimmed the surface in 
terms of understanding how crowdfunded firms develop after a successful campaign and how 
their development differs from non-crowdfunded firms or firm that raised financing through 
alternative sources of entrepreneurial finance. There remain many opportunities to broaden our 
understanding of the consequences of crowdfunding for firm outcomes and the factors that 
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explain why some crowdfunded firms are more successful than others. While the type of 
crowdfunding certainly matters, there is also evidence that more developed firms (e.g., with 
positive sales during the campaign) and more professional firms (e.g.., that receive support from 
professional investors, have better developed financial plans, have more complete project 
schedules) are less likely to subsequently fail and attract more extra financial benefits from 
crowdfunding,   
 
8.3.2. Avenues for future research 
It is clear that “we are still in the early days of crowdfunding, especially on the equity side, and 
its evolution will be exciting to watch” and research (Mollick and Robb, 2016: 86). Today, an 
increasing amount of data becomes available on the outcomes of crowdfunded firms, which 
opens important avenues for researchers. Below, we discuss several avenues for future research 
that we believe hold significant promise. 
 The entrepreneurial finance literature is characterized by significant segmentation (e.g., 
Cosh et al., 2009; Cumming and Vismara, 2017; Hanssens et al., 2016). One type of 
segmentation is by financing source. Largely separate streams of literature exist on banking, VC, 
angel investors, trade credit, and more recently crowdfunding. Focusing on a specific source of 
financing is needed to obtain a comprehensive understanding of that financing source, but it is 
also important to acknowledge that entrepreneurs do not generally limit themselves to one 
financing source and that distinct financing sources interact. Future crowdfunding research could 
more fully explore interactions between distinct types of crowdfunding and more ‘traditional’ 
sources of financing. For instance, what are the consequences of crowdfunding on the modus 
operandi of other financiers, such as angel investors, VCs or banks? What is the role of financial 
incumbents (e.g., banks) in the development of crowdfunding platforms? Do these platforms 
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initiated by incumbents operate differently and do the funded firms evolve differently? (Why) Do 
venture capitalists push some of their portfolio companies towards crowdfunding? When VCs 
(angels) and the crowd are joint shareholders, how can principal-principal conflicts be managed 
or minimized? Where do entrepreneurs that were unsuccessful in raising crowdfunding attract 
additional financing, if any? Bridging the segmented entrepreneurial finance literature may allow 
crowdfunding research to speak to a broader audience and make broader contributions. 
The crowdfunding literature in itself has also become segmented by the type of 
crowdfunding and crowdfunding platform. Research on reward-based crowdfunding has almost 
universally focused on US-based platforms Kickstarter and sometimes Indiegogo. Research on 
equity-based crowdfunding has, with some exceptions, focused on UK-based platforms 
Crowdcube and sometimes Seedrs. In many cases, studies on these platforms have investigated 
US-based or UK-based firms, respectively, to reduce unmeasured variance and control for 
country effects. Consequently, while there are hundreds of crowdfunding platforms active across 
the globe (e.g., Dushnitsky et al., 2016, for 15 European countries) our evidence is limited to a 
handful of platforms and countries. Future research that builds a longitudinal cross-country 
sample exploiting firm-level, platform-level and country-level data (similar to the VICO project 
on VC finance, see Bertoni and Marti, 2011; Colombo and Shafi, 2016; Vanacker et al., 2013) 
would have tremendous potential. It would allow scholars to examine how firm outcomes are 
dependent on platform structure? How country institutional (legal frameworks but also informal 
institutions such as culture) influence the development of crowdfunded firms differently from 
similar non-crowdfunded firms?  
Another avenue for future research is to provide a more detailed insight into the potential 
selection and extra-financial effects in crowdfunding markets and to disentangle these effects 
when examining firm outcomes. Specifically, entrepreneurs do not appear at random on 
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crowdfunding platforms, they self-select themselves by actively searching for crowdfunding  
(Eckhardt et al., 2006; Walthoff-Borm et al., 2017b). Platforms also play an increasingly 
important role in selecting from the pool of entrepreneurs that are willing to raise crowdfunding 
those firms that will eventually list on their platforms (Younkin and Kashkooli, 2016). Finally, 
the crowd may also select the best firms or those with the greatest growth potential. Next to 
selection effects, crowdfunding may also bring extra-financial benefits, such as access to 
employees, increased media visibility, and the build-up of a robust customer base (Mollick and 
Kuppuswamy, 2014). Some potential questions include: How do different types of crowdfunding 
platforms select firms and which types are more successful in selecting the best ventures? How 
do crowdfunded firms perform relative to non-crowdfunded firms, and are differences in 
outcomes primarily driven by selection effects or value-added effects? Which types of 
entrepreneurial firms are able to capture more value added from crowdfunding? And what is the 
role of the entrepreneurial team in capturing extra-financial benefits? 
 
8.3.3. Overall conclusion 
In this chapter, we have provided an overview of the relatively scant literature on the 
consequences of raising different types of crowdfunding. More specifically, we have reviewed 
the literature on firm outcomes after a crowdfunding campaign (i.e., firm failure, follow-on 
fundraising, and firm performance) and the promises made by entrepreneurs (i.e., delivery of 
rewards and provision of returns). We have further discussed important avenues for future 
research, which we hope will stimulate scholars to further unravel the consequences of different 
types of crowdfunding and their interaction with other ‘traditional’ sources of entrepreneurial 
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Table 1: Selected Studies on Crowdfunding and Firm Outcomes. 




Two experiments using 104 VCs making 
1,036 screening decisions. 
The volume of crowdinvestors had no meaningful certification effect. The volume 
of crowdfunders had almost no influence in the lending and equity models but 
there is an overall higher willingness to conduct due diligence on a reward-
crowdfunded firm with a high volume of crowdfunders. 
VCs favor investment opportunities funded through platforms that have an 
established record of investment success. 
Mödl (2017, 
Working paper) 
A choice experimental design and data on 
5,280 decisions of 120 venture investors. 
Crowdfunding is a negative signal for professional venture investors but high 
sums of (reward-based) crowdfunding, collected fast by startups with a B2C 
business model, can have a positive effect on VC managers’ funding decisions. 
Securities-based crowdfunding is in general regarded as highly negative by VCs. 
Ryu and Kim 
(2017, Working 
paper) 
Sample of 193 crowdfunded startups 
(Technology category on Kickstarter from 
2011 until 2013) and 708 angel-funded 
startups. 
Crowdfunded startups are less likely to receive subsequent VC investments 
relative to angel-backed startups. Obtaining crowdfunding is positively associated 






Survey data of 158 projects that raised 
financing and 128 projects that failed to 
raise financing on Kickstarter in the 
Technology, Product Design, and Video 
Reward-based crowdfunding can support more traditional entrepreneurship: over 
90% of successful projects remained ongoing ventures, and 32% of all these 
reported yearly revenues of over $100,000 a year since the Kickstarter campaign 
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Games categories between 2009 and mid-
2012.  
and added an average of 2.2 employees per successful project.  
Crowdfunding provided many potential benefits beyond the crowdfunded money 
itself, including helping provide access to customers, press, employees, and 
outside funders. 
Projects that are better prepared are more likely to gain benefits and deliver on 
time. Endorsements and having appropriate backgrounds is also helpful. Some of 
the factors found to lead to successful fundraising (having many Facebook friends, 





212 successfully funded initial equity 
offerings on Crowdcube from inception 
(2011) to 2015 
17.9% failed. 45.8% are active with no subsequent events. 34.9% raised follow-on 
funding, either in the form of private equity injection or follow-on offering on a 
crowdfunding platform. 






Data from 2009 to 2015 on Kickstarter 
campaigns and on VC investments 
A 1% increase in the annual number of Kickstarter campaigns in 1 year predicted 
a 0.097% increase in the annual number of VC campaigns in the following year, a 
0.092% increase in the subsequent year, and about a 0.067% increase in the third 
year. Successful campaigns may attract the attention of VCs to innovators in the 
region or to the specific people running these successful campaigns. 
Walthoff-Borm, 
Vanacker, 
Successfully equity crowdfunded UK 
ventures from Crowdcube and Seedrs and 
Equity crowdfunded firms exhibit lower financial performance but higher 






matched non-crowdfunded ventures Equity crowdfunded firms financed through a nominee structure make smaller 
losses and the worst performing firms seem to be pushed towards failure more 
quickly, relative to equity crowdfunded firms financed through a direct 
shareholder structure. Equity crowdfunded firms financed through a nominee 
structure also invest significantly more in intangible assets after the campaign, but 
those financed through a direct shareholder structure have more patent 
applications, including foreign patent applications. 
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Table 2: Selected Studies on the Delivery of Rewards and Provision of Returns.  






All fraud cases from 2010 through 2015 
on Kickstarter and Indiegogo that spans 
nine countries. 
Fraud in donation- and reward-based crowdfunding remains limited, with detected 
scam rates of below 0.01%. 
Iyer et al. (2015, 
MS) 
A large-scale sample of over 194,000 
listings on Prosper (peer-to-peer lending). 
The average annual lender interest rate offered to lenders is 16.6%.  
Over 30% of the funded listings default in the three-year duration of the loan, 
where, the default rate varies with the credit category: 14.7% for the most 
creditworthy borrowers and 51.6% for the least creditworthy borrowers.  
The fraction of the principal repaid at the end of the loan term is on average 79.7% 




471 successful Kickstarter projects in 
Design and Technology and 200 
successful Kickstarter projects in Film, 
Food, and Theater. 
[Design and Technology] 24.9% of projects delivered on time, and those that 
delivered, they did so with a delay of 2.4 months. Direct failure rate was 3.6%. 
[Film, Food, and Theater] 23.4% of projects delivered on time, and, of those that 
delivered, they did so with a delay of 2.7 months. Only 2.3% of projects showed 
indications of potential fraud. 
Larger projects and projects that most exceeded their goals were at the greatest 
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212 successfully funded initial equity 
offerings on Crowdcube from inception 
(2011) to 2015 
3 firms were targeted in M&A deals, with a 48.8% average realized return. 
 
 
